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This paper rectiﬁes a design problem in the Santa Fe Artiﬁcial
Stock Market Model. Due to a faulty mutation operator, the result-
ing bit distribution in the classiﬁer system was systematically up-
wardly biased, thus suggesting increased levels of technical trading for
smaller GA-invocation intervals. The corrected version partly sup-
ports the Marimon-Sargent-Hypothesis that adaptive classiﬁer agents
in an artiﬁcial stock market will always discover the homogeneous ra-
tional expectation equilibrium. While agents always ﬁnd the correct
solution of non-bit usage, analyzing the time series data still suggests
the existence of two diﬀerent regimes depending on learning speed. Fi-
nally, classiﬁer systems and neural networks as data mining techniques
in artiﬁcial stock markets are discussed.
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In the last decade, the use of agent-based simulations of markets has gained
more and more acceptance among social scientists. This methodology has
ﬁrst been heavily used by physical scientists who simulate complex systems of
many interacting particles. In ﬁnancial economics, such a ‘particle’ is repre-
sented by an investor who interacts with other investors. A major advantage
is that these models allow the removal of many restrictive assumptions that
are required by analytical models for tractability. For instance, all investors
in such a model could be modeled as heterogenous with respect to their
preferences, endowments, and trading strategies.
Among the numerous agent-based simulations of ﬁnancial markets (e.g.,
Cont and Bouchaud 2000, Farmer 2000, Chen, Lux and Marchesi 2001), the
Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market Model (SFI-ASM) is one of the pioneering
models and thus probably the most well-known and best studied.1 It has
been developed since 1989 and has been described in various papers (Arthur
et al. 1997, Palmer et al. 1989, LeBaron et al. 1999). One of its main results
is the identiﬁcation of a single parameter, i.e., the learning speed of agents,
which is able to shift the model to either a regime that is close to the homo-
geneous rational expectation equilibrium, or to a more complex regime that
better ﬁts the empirical facts. The complex regime emerges for fast learning
rates and exhibited technical trading that dominated fundamental strategies.
Consequently, Joshi, Parker, and Bedau (1988 and 2002) concluded that ﬁ-
nancial markets inevitably are at sub-optimal equilibria, and that technical
trading is caused by a typical prisoner’s dilemma.
However, a closer investigation of the genetic algorithm that updates the
trading rules of agents reveals a ﬂaw that shifts the outcome towards these
results. In particular, a faulty mutation operator causes a systematic upward
bias in the level of set bits in the condition parts of trading rules, thus sug-
gesting increased levels of fundamental and technical trading for faster learn-
ing speeds. Yet, when eliminating these technical inﬂuences on the bit-level
by a corrected mutation operator and a rule consistency check, the genetic
algorithm (GA) of the classiﬁer system always discovers the correct homo-
geneous rational expectation equilibrium (hree) of non-bit usage, no matter
1There are, in fact, several ‘generations’ of the SFI-ASM on diﬀerent programming
platforms. An overview over the SFI market history can be found in LeBaron (2002)
and Johnson (2002). A current objective-C version using the Swarm package is currently
hosted by Paul Johnson at http://ArtStkMkt.sourceforge.net. The results reported in this
paper are obtained with a newly programmed Java version using the RePast library. The
source code will be soon made available on the internet.
1which GA-invocation interval is used. Nonetheless, for slow learning speeds,
the simulated time series still suggest the existence of a hree-regime, while in
the fast learning case, a complex-regime with increased price volatility and
trading volume emerges.
This paper indicates that it is much harder to generate technical trading
and herding behavior in a classiﬁer-based artiﬁcial stock market than initially
thought. In the SFI-ASM, technical trading was supposed to emerge as
a synchronization of individual trading rules by means of coordinating on
identical condition parts. However, this paper suggests that the possibilities
provided by the classiﬁer system to coordinate on similar technical trading
strategies are too weak. If one wishes to reproduce the empirical facts of
technical trading and herding behavior, other mechanisms must be found to
be used in agent-based models with classiﬁer systems.
In order to be self-contained, Section 2 ﬁrst introduces the basic structure
of the original SFI-ASM with its main results. At the end of that section, the
ﬂawed mutation operator is analyzed and its eﬀects on the bit distribution
are illustrated. In Section 3, an updated mutation operator and a rule consis-
tency check are developed such that any technical inﬂuence on the resulting
bit level can be excluded. Finally, the results of the original and updated
version of the SFI-ASM are compared, and a short discussion of classiﬁer
systems and neural networks as data mining techniques in artiﬁcial ﬁnancial
markets concludes the paper.
2 The original SFI-ASM
2.1 The Basic Structure
The SFI-ASM is inhabited by N traders who are all initially endowed with
one unit of risky stock and 20;000 units of cash. During each period, traders
have to decide how much to invest in risky stock and how much to keep in
cash assets which yields a risk-free rate of return rf.
The stock pays a stochastic dividend per period which is generated by a
mean-reverting autoregressive Ohrnstein-Uhlenbeck process
dt+1 = ¯ d + ½(dt ¡ ¯ d) + ²t+1; (1)
with ²t » N(0;¾2
²). Traders are homogeneous with respect to their utility




with ¸ being the degree of risk-aversion. Under the assumption of a normal
distribution of returns, agents maximize their expected utility subject to the
budget constraint
Wi;t+1 = xi;t(pt+1 + dt+1) + (1 + rf)(Wi;t ¡ ptxi;t); (3)
where xi;t is the amount of stock an agent i holds in period t. The optimal
amount of stock c xi;t that an agent desires to hold is then determined as
c xi;t =




where Ei;t[pt+1 + dt+1] is his expectation in t about the next period’s real-
ization of the stock’s price and dividend, and ¾2
t;p+d the empirically observed
variance of the combined price plus dividend time series. A specialist collects
all eﬀective demands as well as its partial derivatives with respect to the price
and tries to ﬁnd a market clearing price in an iterative process. If complete
market clearing is not reached after a speciﬁed number of trials, one side of
the market will be rationed.
While traders are homogenous with respect to their utility functions and
degrees of risk aversion, they have heterogeneous expectations about future
prices and dividends Ei;t[pt+1+dt+1]. It could be interpreted that they diﬀer
in the way they process an identical information set. Forecasts are derived
via trading rules from which each agent possesses an individual set of 100
rules. A rule consists of a condition part, a forecast part (predictor), its
ﬁtness value, and forecast accuracy. Thus, a forecast is derived according to
if (condition fulﬁlled) then (use predictor to derive forecast):
The condition parts are checked against a Boolean market descriptor Dt
which holds current and past price and dividend information. For example,
a particular market state could be that the price of the stock is greater than
n-times its fundamental value, while at the same time, the 25-period moving
average of the stock price is greater than the price mean. When a particular
predeﬁned condition is met, the corresponding descriptor bit is set to 1,
otherwise to 0.
The condition part, on the other hand, is coded as a ternary string hold-
ing either 1 or 0, depending on whether the corresponding bit in the market
3descriptor has to be matched or not, and # if the rule ignores that particular
descriptor bit.2 Rules with numerous #-signs are quite general and hence,
they will be activated more often than more speciﬁc rules. The bits of a trad-
ing rule may be characterized as either technical or fundamental. Technical
bits check only price or trading volume information, while fundamental bits
relate the price of a stock to its fundamental value by using dividend informa-
tion. For example, dividends and prices are checked to determine whether
they increased or decreased, and whether they are above or below certain
moving averages. Most importantly, prices are checked against a stock’s
fundamental value by comparing for each ratio in the brackets whether





















is fulﬁlled. While all agents in the model may use fundamental bits, the
fraction of agents that have access to technical bits is sometimes varied.
¿From the set of 100 individual trading rules that each agent possesses,
normally more than one match the speciﬁed condition. All rules that fulﬁll
this condition are marked as active, yet agents still have to choose one for
their forecast production. This is done via the roulette wheel mechanism
which favors rules with good ﬁtness scores over those with low ﬁtness values.
Finally, a forecast is generated by a linear equation
Et;i[pt+1 + dt+1] = ai;j(pt + dt) + bi;j (6)
with aj and bj being real valued parameters constituting the predictor part
of a chosen trading rule j. Only in rare occasions, when no rules match
the market descriptor, the parameters a and b are determined as a ﬁtness
weighted average of all aj and bj with j = 1:::100.
One period later, the accuracy of all activated rules is checked by comparing
their predictions E[pt+1 + dt+1] with the actual realization of (pt+1 + dt+1).















(pt + dt) ¡ [ai;j(pt¡1 + dt¡1) + bi;j]
i2
: (7)
This forecast accuracy is measured as a weighted average of previous and
current squared forecasting errors. The parameter µ determines the size of
2Technically, the units in the ternary strings should be called trits. A trit is the smallest
unit that can hold three values. However, as is usually done in the literature, we will refer
to them as bits.
4the time window that agents take into account when estimating a rule’s
accuracy. As LeBaron et al. (1999, p. 1496) have pointed out, the value of
µ is a crucial design question since it strongly aﬀects the speed of accuracy
adjustment and thus, learning in the artiﬁcial stock market. If µ = 1, the
rules would be judged only on the last period’s performance and forecast
accuracy would be strongly prone to noise. In the other extreme, however,
as µ goes to 1, agents would take all past information into account, implicitly
assuming that they live in a stationary world. As in LeBaron et al (1999), a
value of 75 is chosen for µ.
The forecast accuracy º2
t;j is used as a rule’s variance estimate ¾2
t;(p+d),
which is used in equation (4). Furthermore, it is the main determinant of a
rule’s ﬁtness




t;j + bitCost £ specificity
¢
; (8)
with specificity being the number of conditions in a rule that are not
ignored, bitCost as an associated cost for each bit set, and C as a positive
constant to ensure positive ﬁtness3. Attaching positive cost for every non-
ignored bit could be interpreted as the cost of acquiring and evaluating new
information. Penalizing rule speciﬁcity is also tantamount to a complexity
aversion since it favors simple rules over more speciﬁc ones. Furthermore,
it ensures that each checked condition contains useful information in the
trading rule.
2.2 Learning and Rule Evolution
So far, agents have been equipped with a static rule set. Feedback learning
in the stock market has taken place by identifying and using the rules that
performed better than others, while the learning speed and quality were
strongly dependent on the parameter µ. However, if an agent started with
a rule set that contained only bad performing rules, in the absence of any
other learning mechanism, she would not be able to ﬁnd better ones. Thus, a
genetic algorithm (GA) provides a way to alter the rule sets by replacing bad
performing rules with new, possibly better ones4. By searching the possible
search space in a random, yet not directionless fashion, the GA creates the
basis for further explorative learning of the agents that takes place on a longer
time scale than the accuracy estimation.
3Variable names as they appear in the source code of the model are typed in courier.
4Two useful introductions to genetic algorithms, which were originally developed by
Holland (1975), are provided in Goldberg (1989) and Mitchell (1996).
5For each agent, the GA is invoked every K periods on average and replaces
the 20 worst rules of the rule set by newly created ones. In doing so, the
GA uses the genetic operators of mutation and crossover. Mutation is an
important part for any evolutionary algorithm and could be interpreted as
learning by experiment or by unintended mistakes.5 It helps to maintain a
diverse population and avoids premature convergence of the search algorithm.
For mutation, which is performed with a probability of 0.7 in the model, one
parent is chosen by using tournament selection. Here, two candidates are
randomly drawn from the rule set and the ﬁtter one is selected to be the
parent. A genetically identical oﬀspring is created from the parent, and with
a small mutation probability of 0.03, each bit in the condition part of the
oﬀspring is ﬂipped at random. The real valued parameters of the predictor
are changed by adding random numbers to them. The oﬀspring’s forecast
accuracy is set at the median accuracy of all rules.
Contrary to mutation, crossover is a sexual genetic operator that requires
two ﬁt parents in order to work. Even though there are a variety of diﬀerent
crossover operators available, the original SFI model exclusively uses uniform
crossover for the condition parts. Here, an oﬀspring’s bit is chosen with equal
probability from the corresponding bit positions from either one or the other
parent. Note that the fraction of bits set in the oﬀspring is an unweighted
average of the two parents’ bit fraction. Thus, there is no systematic inﬂuence
on average speciﬁcity through the working of the crossover operator.
parent 1 # 0 1 # # # # 1 1
parent 2 # 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
oﬀspring # 0 1 # 1 # 0 1 0
Table 1: Example of uniform crossover on the condition part.
As for the real valued parameters, LeBaron et al. (1999, p. 1498) point
out that there is little experience in the GA community regarding how to
perform the crossover. Their approach is to construct the new parameter
values by determining a weighted average of the two parents values, with
1=¾2
j;p+d as the weight for each parent. The weights are normalized to sum
up to 1.
5See, for instance, Riechmann (2001: 1021), or Dawid (1999: 68).
62.3 Experimental Results by the SFI-ASM
Depending on the GA-invocation interval, the original SFI-ASM was able to
generate two diﬀerent regimes (e.g., Arthur et al. 1997 and LeBaron et al.
1999). The so-called rational expectations regime emerged when agents had
a slow learning rate, i.e., the GA was only seldom invoked, on average every
100 periods. Bit usage remained low and the agent’s forecast parameters con-
verged to their homogeneous rational expectation equilibrium (hree)-values,
thus indicating that agents became more and more homogeneous.
On the other hand, the rich psychological or complex regime arose when
agents had a fast exploration rate, i.e., the GA was often invoked. Here,
the continuously co-evolving agents remained heterogeneous with respect to
their bit usage and forecast parameters. In fact, the increased use of technical
trading bits was often considered to be the most striking diﬀerence between
the two regimes and was interpreted as an emergent property of the market.
Furthermore, the price series exhibited unstable behavior such as bubbles
and crashes, as well as other statistical properties like fat tails in the return
distribution that can also be observed in real ﬁnancial markets. Trading
volume exhibited GARCH-behavior and was auto-correlated while having a
positive cross-correlation with volatility and squared returns. Price volatility
and risk premiums were signiﬁcantly higher compared to the slow learning
case. Since none of these nonlinear eﬀects can be attributed to the underlying
dividend process, they are an emergent property of the market process, i.e.,
the interactions of many heterogeneous agents. Thus, the SFI-model also
supports the “interacting agent hypothesis” as proposed by Lux (1998) and
Lux and Marchesi (1999).
By using a game theoretic framework, Joshi, Parker, and Bedau (2002)
determined an agent’s optimal learning rate in the SFI-ASM by analyzing
the wealth that diﬀerent types of agents have acquired. They found a unique
strategic Nash equilibrium which clearly falls into the complex market regime,
which is ineﬃcient compared to other forecast revision rates. Thus, they
concluded that ﬁnancial markets can result in a sub-optimal equilibria. In
their 1998 paper, Joshi, Parker, and Bedau concluded that technical trading
emerges as a result of a typical prisoner’s dilemma. Since technical traders
can exploit short term patterns in the price series, technical trading generates
more wealth compared to pure fundamental trading and is thus a dominant
strategy for them. Since the market constitutes a symmetric simultaneous-
move N-person game, a dominant strategy for one player is a dominant strat-
egy for all players. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, all rational traders
are technical traders, yet this equilibrium is sub-optimal compared with a
7hypothetical equilibrium in which traders have no access to technical trading
rules.
2.4 The Problem: A Faulty Mutation Operator
Even though these results have a huge theoretical appeal, at least some of
them have to be reconsidered in the light of the faulty mutation operator
that was used in the SFI-ASM. This problem in the mutation operator might
have systematically twisted the simulated outcomes towards the results as
described above. Unlike crossover, the mutation operator is not neutral to
the initial level of bits set and usually introduces an upward bias in the
resulting bit level. Thus, any interpretation that is directly or indirectly
linked to rule speciﬁcity and emergent technical trading must be treated
with caution. In the fast learning regime, since the genetic algorithm, and
hence the mutation operator, are invoked more often, the resulting ﬁnal bit
level is directly upwardly biased. A higher average rule speciﬁcity is, in turn,
connected to a smaller fraction of activated rules per agent which might
introduce instabilities and ineﬃciencies in this agent’s ordering behavior.
In order to demonstrate the bit increasing eﬀect through mutation, we
must look at the bit transition probabilities as given in LeBaron et al. (1999:
1498). Once a bit is chosen for mutation with probability ¼, it is changed
according to the bit transition probabilities as shown in table (2).
0
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 0
1=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 0
2=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
1
1=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 1
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 1
2=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
#
1=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 #
1=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 #
1=3
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
Table 2: Transition probabilities in the original SFI-mutator.
LeBaron et al. assert that these transition probabilities would, on average,
maintain the speciﬁcity, i.e., the fraction of #’s in a rule. However, if we
denote the initial fraction of bits set before mutation with P 2 [0;1], we
ﬁnd that the non-# bits are mutated to non-# bits with a probability of
P 0
j0;17!1;0 = 1
3P, while the probability that a #-bit is mutated to either 1 or
0 equals P 0
j#7!0;1 = 2
3(1 ¡ P). Thus, for any given P, the fraction of bits set






(2 ¡ P): (9)
8Since P 0
j0;1;#7!1;0 2 [0;1] is a continuous function for all P 2 [0;1], we know
by a ﬁxed point theorem that an equilibrium exists. By repeatedly invoking
the mutation operator, equation (9) converges to its equilibrium value of one
half.6
Because the model usually functions well below this level, the mutation
operator introduces an upward bias in the bit distribution. In other words,
the mutation operator is not neutral to the initial level of non-# bits. This
upward tendency is illustrated in ﬁgure (1) by varying the probability with





















































































































































































































































Figure 1: Total Fraction of Bits Used as a Function of Crossover Probability. Data were
obtained from a cross section of 5 separate runs at diﬀerent random seeds.
Even though the bit increasing eﬀect of mutation is obvious, the theoretical
equilibrium level of 0:5 is far from being attained. This is due to a variety of
6This result also holds if every bit in the bitstring is mutated with a probability of less
than one. In the SFI-ASM, this mutation probability ¼ is set to 0.03. Deriving the fraction
of non-# bits in the same manner as above yields P0
j0;1;#7!1;0 = 2






It is easy to check this formula by setting ¼ = 1, which will yield equation (9), or by
setting ¼ = 0, which will yield P0
j0;1;#7!1;0 = P since no mutation will ever be performed.
The equilibrium level equals 1=2, even though convergence occurs a little bit slower than
before.
7The GA calls either the crossover operator with a probability of ΠCo, or the mutation
operator with a probability of ΠM = 1 ¡ ΠCo.
9other model parameters that also inﬂuence the ﬁnal bit distribution, usually
in the opposite direction. First of all, the GA replaces only a fraction of
the rules, typically one ﬁfth, by newly created ones. Secondly, by looking at
equation (5), we realize that the GA might produce illogical rules such as
rule 1 in table (4). A typical remedy is to work with a larger rule set and
to invoke a generalization procedure for any rule that has not been matched
for the last maxNonActive periods. This procedure lowers rule speciﬁcity
by converting set bits to # with probability genFrac. Third, the bitCost
parameter penalizes every non-# bit and thus, the GA preferably selects rules
with below average speciﬁcity for mutation and crossover. Hence, positive
bitCost cause a downward tendency in the ﬁnal bit level.
Since positive bit cost causes the resulting bit fraction to be attracted
towards the zero bit level, LeBaron et al. (1999) view it as a necessary
robustness check to see whether the artiﬁcial stock market can withstand
the inﬂow of technical trading rules. The extensive use of trading bits in
the fast learning regime compared to the hree-regime leads them to conclude
that they reﬂect emergent technical trading which must be an expression of
some ﬁtness-based advantages over more general rules.
However, since we know by now that the mutation operator has a ﬁxed
point of 0.5 towards which the equilibrium bit level is torn, we cannot assert
simply by the existence of technical trading bits that technical trading has
emerged. Furthermore, the presence of trading bits does not necessarily mean
that agents use them. To draw such a conclusion, one would actually have
to count how often general or more speciﬁc rules were selected for use by the
agents.
3 A Corrected Version of the SFI-ASM
3.1 Suggested Corrections
In order to obtain valid results with respect to the resulting bit levels, one
should only implement bit neutral operators and procedures. While the bit
decreasing eﬀect of bitCost is desirable as it is a ﬁtness-based inﬂuence, it
is not desirable for the generalization procedure and the mutation operator
since it is completely technical and economically not interpretable.
Thus, the corrected version of the model to which I will henceforth refer
to as the NESFI-ASM (Norman Ehrentreich’s SFI-ASM), is equipped with
a bit neutral mutation operator and a rule consistency check which ensures
10that only logical rules are created by the GA.8
Unlike the original SFI-ASM, the bit neutral mutation operator works
with dynamically adjusting bit transition probabilities. To allow for diverg-
ing fundamental and technical bit usage in the model, we distinguish between
the initial fraction of fundamental bits set Ffund:, and the initial fraction of
technical bits set Ftechn:. Thus, the bit neutral mutation operator is charac-
terized by the bit transition probabilities shown in table (3)9.
fundamental bits 0
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 0
Ffund: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 0
1¡Ffund: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
technical bits 0
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 0
Ftechn: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 0
1¡Ftechn: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
fundamental bits 1
Ffund: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 1
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 1
1¡Ffund: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
technical bits 1
Ftechn: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 1
0 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 1




7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 #
1
2Ffund:
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 #




7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 0 #
1
2Ftechn:
7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! 1 #
1¡Ftechn: 7¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ! #
Table 3: Transition Probabilities in a Bit-Neutral Mutation Operator.
However, since Ffund: and Ftechn: are averaged over all rules of an agent,
this mutation operator is still not completely freed from an upward pressure
in the output fraction of bits set. Since speciﬁcity bears some costs by low-
ering a rule’s ﬁtness, general rules tend to be selected for mutation, provided
that their predictive power is at least as good as those of more speciﬁc rules.
Thus, the fraction of bits set in a single rule tends to be augmented by mu-
tation, not lowered, since the average fraction of bits set in an agent’s rule
set is, in general, bigger than the fraction of bits sets in those rules that were
chosen. However, the magnitude of that eﬀect is probably negligible.
The consistency check, on the other hand, corrects inconsistencies pro-
duced by the GA. It does so by expressing a logical bit sequence with the
least amount of non-# bits necessary, i.e., one or two. However, depending
on whether the checking procedure starts analyzing the bit sequence from
8Even though the need for a generalization procedure is drastically reduced by the
consistency check, some bit combinations of the condition part might never occur, and
thus, the generalization procedure is still kept active.
9Since the main purpose of mutation is usually to maintain a diverse population by
arbitrarily introducing new bits, this function might be hampered by the suggested tran-
sition probabilities. Once a zero fraction of used bits is reached, there would be no way
to reintroduce condition bits into the rule set. Thus, ensuring strictly positive transition
probabilities such as max[Ffund:;minProb] with minProb > 0 might be appropriate.
11the lower bits upward or vice versa, diﬀerent results will be returned by it.
Hence, both variants will be chosen with equal probability. Some examples
of input and output sequences are given in table (4).












rule 1 # # 0 1 # 0 #
rule 2 # # 1 1 # 0 #
Ã ¡ ¡ ¡
rule 1 7¡! rule 3 # # # 1 # 0 #
¡ ¡ ¡ !
rule 1 7¡! rule 4 # # 0 # # # #
Table 4: Creating Logical Rules through Consistency Check.
The ﬁrst rule contains a contradictory condition. Rule 2, on the other
hand, might be considered a corrected version. However, the third rule
demonstrates that the same information can be coded by using less acti-
vated bits. This rule would be returned by the consistency check if it starts
analyzing from the higher order bits, otherwise the fourth rule would be
returned.
After having eliminated all technical inﬂuences on the bit distribution,
one can be sure that every single bit in a trading rule emerges through com-
petition and ﬁtness considerations.10 Chances are high that bits will only
survive if they indeed contain useful information.
3.2 Experimental Results
3.2.1 Agents Forecast Properties
As one could expect, an analysis of the real valued forecasting parameters as
well as the mean variance of all rules does not exhibit substantial diﬀerences
from the original SFI model. Thus, the diﬀerences for these parameters in
the slow and fast learning regime must be caused by other reasons than a
more or less extensive use of condition bits.
However, when comparing the bit usage between the original SFI-ASM
and the NESFI-ASM, one immediately recognizes substantial diﬀerences. For
10A pleasant side eﬀect of the consistency check is that one can work with a smaller
rule set, since every rule could be principally activated. The saved computation time is
probably larger than the time needed for the checking procedure.
12all GA-intervals, no emergent technical trading can be detected, not even
temporarily. More interestingly, agents completely abandon technical and
fundamental bit usage in the long run and do not check any conditions at
all.11 This result is so robust that one could doubt the proper working of the
classiﬁer system. Thus, the model behavior was tested for classiﬁer mode
and non-classiﬁer mode. For the latter, agents had no access to condition
bits at all. In both cases, they were confronted with a periodic square wave
dividend stream. Even though the simulated price series tracked the crude
risk neutral price astoundingly well in the non-classiﬁer mode, the tracking
behavior in classiﬁer mode was far superior for most GA intervals. Agents
started to use some fundamental as well as technical bits extensively while
neglecting others, and were thus able to predict prices much more accurately.
Consequently, the classiﬁer agents also acquired more wealth than the non-
classiﬁer agents.
Hence, it is shown that the classiﬁer system works very eﬃciently. When
confronted with periodic dividend data, it detects these patterns, yet when
working with stochastic data, it also discovers the “right” solution of non-bit
usage. Even though the mean-reverting dividend process is able to produce
short term trends toward its mean, these are by no means regular. Thus, in
the long run, the stochastic nature of the dividend process dominates any
(random) short term trends and pattern.
However, depending on the GA-invocation interval, it may sometimes
be relatively diﬃcult for the GA to discover the non-bit usage solution. In
ﬁgure (2), the average number of GA-invocations needed to reach the zero-
bit level is plotted as a function of the invocation interval. Here, one realizes
a strong increase for the fundamental bits for interval lengths between 10
and 250 periods.12 The GA probably temporarily detects what it believes to
be short term patterns, yet in the long run, when testing and acting upon
these adapted rules, it realizes that they do no better than the all-# rule. It
is also apparent that irrespective of the invocation interval length, technical
bits are driven out of the rule set equally fast.13
11In order to better demonstrate the strong attraction of the zero bit level, a positive
minimum transition probability for the mutation operator has not been implemented.
12The picture is quite diﬀerent if the two parameters Ftechn: and Ffund: are global for
all agents. There, a signiﬁcant amount of social learning occurs such that the maximum
number of GA-invocations needed to ﬁnd the non-bit solution does not exceed 45.
13There is a small possibility that one has simply not found the “right” conditions to
code. The neural network approach by LeBaron (2001b) endogenizes the required hard
wiring of key breakpoints in the classiﬁer system, yet when altering some of the price ratios
or moving averages break points, or including other technical information such as trading
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Figure 2: Average Number of GA-Invocations Needed Until Zero-Bit Level
is Reached (averaged over 25 runs)
We will refer to the bit level behavior as part one of the Marimon-
Sargent-Hypothesis. According to Waldrop (1992: 270), Ramon Marimon
and Thomas Sargent claimed in discussions with John Holland and Brian
W. Arthur that adaptive classiﬁer agents in an artiﬁcial stock market model
would quickly learn the neoclassical rational equilibrium solution. They were
led to this statement through their own research (Marimon, McGrattan and
Sargent: 1990) in which they assigned adaptive classiﬁer agents to solve
Wicksell’s triangle in a Kiyotaki-Wright (1989) type model. There, they
found that the agents always discovered the neoclassical solution, i.e., the
good with the lowest storage cost emerged as a medium of exchange.
Unlike the original SFI model, the corrected NESFI-ASM ﬁnally sup-
ports the Marimon-Sargent-Hypothesis. All agents realize that, under the
given dividend process, all they need for their forecast production is the last
period’s price and dividend information, which is compatible with the linear
rational expectation equilibrium.
3.2.2 Time Series Properties
A typical neoclassical rational equilibrium solution would not only be charac-
terized by a total neglect of any additional information contained in condition
14bits, but it would furthermore exhibit “nice” price series properties. Whether
the time series are consistent with the neoclassical solution will be considered
as part two of the Marimon-Sargent Hypothesis.
One should keep in mind that the proposed changes to the GA only aﬀect
the condition part and not the real valued forecast parameters of a trading
rule. Thus, one would expect the two models to produce similar time series,
i.e., “well behaved” ones for the slow learning case and more complicated
ones for faster GA-invocation intervals.
This hypothesis was tested by running the same statistical tests on the
time series and comparing the results with those published in LeBaron et
al. (1999: 1501). All model parameters were set to the same values reported
there. The hree-case serves as a benchmark in which the dividend and market
price should be a linear function of their ﬁrst order lags. Thus, they are
regressed on a lag and a constant
pt+1 + dt+1 = a(pt + dt) + b + ²t; (10)
with the residuals ² being i.i.d. and N(0,4) distributed. The results are
summarized in table (5).
First of all, one notices that the corrected NESFI-version produces time
series that are generally closer to the hree-benchmark. Most statistics for
the NESFI-version show smaller deviations from the hree-benchmark than
the corresponding SFI-values. The standard deviations in the residuals are
smaller, thus indicating less price variability. Excess kurtosis is almost negli-
gible for both the fast and slow learning cases, which contradicts the empirical
fact of fat-tailed return distributions. Yet, when further enhancing the learn-
ing speed, both the increase in standard deviation and excess kurtosis suggest
that the NESFI-model shifts into a complex regime for faster learning rates
than the original SFI-model. This corresponds closely with the fact that the
GA had increasing diﬃculties ﬁnding the correct solution of non-bit usage
in the condition parts for invocation intervals less than 100. The autocorre-
lation in the residuals, as shown in the third row, demonstrates that there
is little linear structure remaining. As LeBaron et al. indicate, any artiﬁcial
stock market should exhibit negligible autocorrelations since they are very
low for real markets. The next row reports the means of the test statistics
for the ARCH test proposed by Engle (1982). There is considerably less
ARCH dependence in the residuals for the NESFI-version. It is interesting
to note that even for very small GA invocation intervals, some test runs are
not able to reject the no-ARCH hypothesis. Only for a GA invocation in
15Description GA 1000 GA 250 GA 20 GA 1
NESFI SFI NESFI SFI
Std. Dev. 2.084 2.135 2.141 2.147 2.229 3.397
(.009) (.008) (.013) (.017) (.013) (.034)
Excess kurtosis 0.004 0.072 0.001 0.320 0.050 9.046
(.009) (.012) (.001) (.020) (.011) (1.56)
½1 0.011 0.036 0.014 0.007 0.029 0.491
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.001) (.006)
ARCH(1) 2.610 3.159 2.754 36.98 5.722 1871.9
[0.20] [0.44] [0.40] [1.00] [0:48] [1:00]
½2
1 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.064 0.020 0.425
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.017)
BDS 1.06 1.28 1.10 3.11 1.44 38.63
[0.20] [0.24] [0.24] [0.84] [0.28] [1.00]
Excess return 1.52% 2.89% 1.59% 3.06% 1.51% 25.34%
(.02%) (.03%) (.03%) (.05%) (.03%) (3.41%)
Trading volume 0.244 0.355 0.271 0.706 0.876 1.359
(.008) (.021) (.007) (.047) (.009) (.015)
Table 5: Comparison of the NESFI and SFI-version of the model. Means over 25 runs.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors estimated using the 25 runs. Numbers in
brackets are the fraction of tests rejecting the no-ARCH or iid-hypothesis for the ARCH
and BDS tests, respectively, at the 95% conﬁdence level.
every period, can extreme ARCH-behavior for all test runs be observed.14 In
row ﬁve, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the squared residuals is another
test for volatility persistence. Again, it increases for faster learning speed,
but is generally lower than for the SFI-case.
The BDS test in row six is a test for nonlinear dependence developed by
Brock et al. (1996). Its test statistic is asymptotically standard normally
distributed under the null hypothesis of independence. There are two free
parameters for this test. The distance r is measured as a fraction of the
standard deviation and has been set to a value of 0:5, while for the embedding
dimension m, a value of two is chosen. One can notice an increasing amount
of nonlinearities for faster exploration rates, yet again, it is substantially
lower for the NESFI-version. Since this test usually rejects the hypothesis
of independence for most ﬁnancial time series, the NESFI-results indicate
14Even for an invocation interval of two, the no-ARCH hypothesis cannot be rejected
for 16% of the test runs.
16that ﬁnancial markets operate at a learning speed that is too fast. Trading
volume, which should be zero in the hree-case, increases signiﬁcantly for faster
learning speeds. This points to a greater degree of heterogeneity between the
agents.
Overall, the original conclusion that the learning speed aﬀects the out-
come towards a hree-regime and complex regime can still be conﬁrmed after
the proposed change. However, complex time series behavior seems to emerge
only for substantially faster learning speeds than in the SFI-version. It is also
apparent that the NESFI-results are generally closer to the hree-benchmark.
An explanation for this behavior could be the larger pool of activated trading
rules from which agents can now choose. In the SFI-version, the increase in
the bit level caused substantially fewer rules to be activated. If, on average,
only a few general rules per agent were activated, agents repeatedly acted
upon them regardless of their predictive power. If the forecast parameters of
these rules were to diverge from the hree-values, less eﬃcient time series were
likely to occur.15 In other words, the larger the pool of activated trading to
choose from, the larger the probability of choosing a good one.
3.2.3 Wealth Behavior
Joshi, Parker, and Bedau (2002) derived the optimal revision rate of investors
via a game theoretic analysis of wealth levels. There, they found that faster
learning agents perform better than slow learning agents by exploiting short
term trends and pattern that the slow learners discard as non-proﬁtable in the
long run. They computed a symmetric Nash-equilibrium for a GA-invocation
interval of 100, which was in the complex regime with technical trading. Due
to lower general wealth levels in the economy compared to the hree-case, they
concluded that ﬁnancial market equilibria would inevitably be sub-optimal.
Unfortunately, these results can only be partly replicated with the NESFI-
version. Diﬀerences in wealth levels due to varying invocation intervals
emerge only in the ﬁrst periods of the market in which the equilibrium has
not yet been found. The faster the GA-invocation interval for an agent, the
faster she will learn the correct risk-adjusted hree-price of the stock. If all
other agents have longer revision rates, the fast learning agent is able to ex-
15This problem could have been ﬁxed in the SFI-version by imposing a minimum number
of activated rules per agent from which to choose. If fewer rules are activated, agents would
resort to the Select Average mechanism, i.e., using forecast parameters that are a ﬁtness-
weighted average of all rules. In the SFI-version, this minimum number was eﬀectively
ﬁxed to one activated rule per agent.
17ploit slower learning agents as long as the market price has not come close
to the equilibrium level. Once this has happened, wealth levels rise almost
proportionally for fast and slow learners, yet on a diﬀerent level. In addi-
tion, classiﬁer agents do considerably better in the warm-up phase of the
market than non-classiﬁer agents, yet in the long-run, the classiﬁer-agents
mutate to non-classiﬁer agents, thereby leaving no opportunity for further
wealth-divergence.
Although weaker, a similar temporary eﬀect on wealth levels can be found
for technical and fundamental traders. In the NESFI-version, traders that
have access to technical trading bits do slightly better than pure fundamental
traders, but only in the beginning. Thus, the conclusion by Joshi, Parker, and
Bedau (1998) that technical trading emerges due to a prisoner’s dilemma, and
that rational traders are technical traders, cannot be upheld by the NESFI-
ASM in the long run. This conclusion was also probably caused by temporary
warm-up eﬀects.
Finally, the NESFI-agents with the corrected mutation operator were
competing against old SFI-agents. Since the abandonment of the classiﬁer
system in the NESFI-version was totally ﬁtness-driven, one expected no dif-
ferences. This hypothesis could be totally veriﬁed. For all phases of the
market, none of the groups did signiﬁcantly better than the other.
4 Summary and Conclusion
After having remedied a technical problem of the SFI-ASM, the corrected
version supports the Marimon-Sargent-Hypothesis that agents in an artiﬁcial
stock market will usually ﬁnd the hree-solution. Independent of learning
speed as modelled by the GA-invocation interval, agents realize that any
temporary pattern in the time series they detect are random, and not worth
acting upon in the long run. Thus, they neglect any additional information
provided by the classiﬁer system. The latter works so eﬃciently for the given
dividend process that it ﬁnally reduces itself to absurdity. It seems that a
classiﬁer system is not well-suited for generating positive feedback trading
or self-fulﬁlling prophecies.16 Thus, if we are only interested in the long run
equilibrium behavior of this artiﬁcial stock market, one could tremendously
16It might be possible to introduce technical trading if agents would be allowed to form
coalitions, i.e., if they could coordinate on certain positive-feedback strategies. While indi-
vidual agents can temporarily use positive feedback strategies, due to non-synchronization
of trading strategies between agents, they might not have the critical mass to produce a
regular pattern that will not vanish over time.
18simplify it by abandoning the classiﬁer system altogether.17
However, it is obvious that at least some real world traders use technical
trading tools and try to discover regularities in the price series that can be
exploited. Thus, the question remains whether we want our agents to analyze
past time series data with some kind of data mining technique. Given the
empirical facts of real ﬁnancial data of clustered volatility, fat tails, crosscor-
relation of returns and volume, and other random walk deviations, the use of
some data mining technique in an artiﬁcial market becomes desirable since it
opens up possibilities for the agents to deviate from the hree-solution. Yet,
we have to be aware that any technique that indeed deviates from the hree-
solution in an artiﬁcial stock market model would obviously be less eﬃcient
than the classiﬁer system which always seems to ﬁnd the correct solution in
the current setting.
However, classiﬁer systems are regarded more and more as a “less than
perfect tool for modern research on ﬁnancial markets” since they are ac-
companied by extensive costs such as the hard wiring of key breakpoints
(LeBaron 2002). Neural networks have thus become popular not only in real
ﬁnancial markets, but recently, also in artiﬁcial stock markets (Beltratti et
al. 1996, LeBaron 2001b). However, Davis (1989a, p. 375) regards classi-
ﬁer systems and neural networks as functionally equivalent. He shows that
any classiﬁer system can be transformed into an isomorphic neural network
(Davis 1989b) and vice versa (Davis 1989a). Thus, a properly speciﬁed neu-
ral network should ﬁnd the same solution as a classiﬁer system, given that
both are provided with the same information set. Since a classiﬁer system
is more well-suited to economic interpretation than the neurons and weights
of a neural network, it appears to have advantages over the latter approach
in an artiﬁcial stock market model. Thus, in my assessment, the controversy
between classiﬁer systems and neural networks has not yet been decided and
further research in comparing both approaches seems necessary.
Regardless of which technique is ﬁnally used, when massively extending
the information set, it will become more and more diﬃcult to ﬁlter out noise.
Given the almost inﬁnite possibilities in the real world to analyze useful (and
useless) data, some regularities will always be found. Whether they will
persist in the long run cannot yet be told. Thus, it is possible that investors
in real ﬁnancial markets are simply too impatient to discard non-proﬁtable
strategies or lack the necessary memory to do so. In a way, the constant
departure of experienced traders and arrival of new traders might induce
17This is true only for stochastic dividends. As soon as periodic components are intro-
duced, classiﬁer agents perform better than non-classiﬁer agents.
19ﬁnancial markets to constantly function out of their long run equilibrium.
Given the result in ﬁgure (2) and the average lifetime of an investor, any
practical learning speed could put us in the region where it is extremely
diﬃcult to discover the hree-solution.
Due to the apparent “inability” of the NESFI-ASM to generate techni-
cal trading, further research should identify conditions under which this is
possible. I suspect that it will not be linked to the kind of data mining sys-
tem being used; more attention should be given to agent interaction. In the
NESFI-ASM, these interactions were only indirect through price eﬀects and
seemed insuﬃcient for generating positive feedback trading. Yet, if agents
were allowed to communicate and collaborate by forming coalitions, they
could coordinate on certain trading strategies, making them a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy. Thus, studying the diﬀerences between individual learning as in
the NESFI-ASM and social learning might be a more promising way to gain
insight into the working of real ﬁnancial markets.
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